2  books
18  papers
4  edited  volumes
17  book  chapters

Books | Papers | Edited Volumes | Book Chapters

Books

Epistemic Engineering

Title: Epistemic Engineering. Uncovering the logic of deceivability and meta-induction

Publisher: Under revision with Rowman & Littlefield International

Elementare Definitionstheorie

Title: Elementare Definitionstheorie (Elementary Theory of Definitions)

Publisher: J.B. Metzler, forthcoming

Papers

  1. The Many Faces of Generalizing the Theory of Evolution.
    In: American Philosophical Quarterly 58.1 (2021), pp.35-50. doi: 10.2307/48600684.
    (Together with Karim Baraghith)
    Abstract
    Ever since proposals for generalizing the theory of natural evolution have been put forward, the aims and ambitions of both proponents and critics have differed widely. Some consider such proposals as merely metaphors, some as analogies, some aim at a real generalization and unification, and some have even proposed to work out full reductions. In this paper it is argued that these different forms of generalizing the theory of evolution can be systematically re-framed as different approaches for transferring justification from the natural to the cultural realm, and that their differences are basically a matter of degree. With the help of such a classification it should be come clearer what to expect, but also what not to expect from the different approaches.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:baraghith2021ManFac,
    Author = {Baraghith, Karim and Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly},
    Title = {The Many Faces of Generalizing the Theory of Evolution},
    Volume = {58},
    Doi = {10.2307/48600684},
    Pages = {35-50},
    Number = {1},
    Year = {2021}}

  2. Cultural Inheritance in Generalized Darwinism.
    In: Philosophy of Science 87.2 (2020), pp.237-261. doi: 10.1086/707564.
    (Together with Karim Baraghith)
    Abstract
    Generalized Darwinism models cultural development as an evolutionary process, where traits evolve through variation, selection, and inheritance. Inheritance describes either a discrete unit’s transmission or a mixing of traits (i.e. blending inheritance). In this paper, we compare classical models of cultural evolution (cf. Boyd and Richerson 1988; Mesoudi 2001) and generalized population dynamics (Schurz 2011) with respect to blending inheritance. We identify problems of these models and introduce our model, which combines relevant features of both. Blending is implemented as success-based social learning, which can be shown to be an optimal strategy.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2020CulInh,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J. and Baraghith, Karim},
    Journal = {Philosophy of Science},
    Title = {Cultural Inheritance in Generalized Darwinism},
    Volume = {87},
    Doi = {10.1086/707564},
    Pages = {237-261},
    Number = {2},
    Year = {2020}}

  3. An Optimality-Argument for Equal Weighting.
    In: Synthese 197.4 (2020), pp.1543-1563. doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-02028-1.
    Abstract
    There are several proposals to resolve the problem of epistemic peer disagreement which concentrate on the question of how to incorporate evidence of such a disagreement. The main positions in this field are the equal weight view, the steadfast view, and the total evidence view. In this paper we present a new argument in favour of the equal weight view. As we will show, this view results from a general approach of forming epistemic attitudes in an optimal way. By this, the argument for equal weighting can be massively strengthened from reasoning via epistemic indifference to reasoning from optimality.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2020OptArg,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Doi = {10.1007/s11229-018-02028-1},
    Journal = {Synthese},
    Volume = {197},
    Number = {4},
    Pages = {1543-1563},
    Title = {An Optimality-Argument for Equal Weighting},
    Year = {2020}}

  4. Confirmation Based on Analogical Inference. Bayes meets Jeffrey.
    In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50.2 (2020), pp.174-194. doi: 10.1017/can.2019.18.
    (Together with Alexander Gebharter)
    Abstract
    Certain hypotheses cannot be directly confirmed for theoretical, practical, or moral reasons. For some of these hypotheses, however, there might be a workaround: confirmation based on analogical reasoning. In this paper we take up Dardashti, Hartmann, Thebault, and Winsberg’s 2017 idea of analyzing confirmation based on analogical inference Bayesian style. We identify three types of confirmation by analogy and show that Dardashti et al.’s approach can cover two of them. We then highlight possible problems with their model as a general approach to analogical inference and argue that these problems can be avoided by supplementing Bayesian update with Jeffrey conditionalization.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2020ConBas,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J. and Gebharter, Alexander},
    Journal = {Canadian Journal of Philosophy},
    Title = {Confirmation Based on Analogical Inference. Bayes meets Jeffrey},
    Volume = {50},
    Number = {2},
    Pages = {174-194},
    Doi = {10.1017/can.2019.18},
    Year = {2020}}

  5. Optimal Probability Aggregation Based on Generalized Brier Scoring.
    In: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (2020). doi: 10.1007/s10472-019-09648-4.
    (Together with Gerhard Schurz)
    Abstract
    In this paper we combine the theory of probability aggregation with results of machine learning theory concerning the optimality of predictions under expert advice. In probability aggregation theory several characterization results for linear aggregation exist. However, in linear aggregation weights are not fixed, but free parameters. We show how fixing such weights by success-based scores, a generalization of Brier scoring, allows for transferring the mentioned optimality results to the case of probability aggregation.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2020OptPro,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J. and Schurz, Gerhard},
    Doi = {10.1007/s10472-019-09648-4},
    Journal = {Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence},
    Title = {Optimal Probability Aggregation Based on Generalized Brier Scoring},
    Pages = {717-734},
    Number = {7},
    Volume = {88},
    Year = {2020}}

  6. Knowledge and Values: A re-entanglement in epistemic regimes.
    In: Science and Public Policy 47.1 (2020). doi: 10.1093/scipol/scz047.
    Abstract
    Knowledge and values are the two main ingredients of public decision making. In the past, the predominant paradigm of such decision making was based on an approach of value-neutral science and aimed at processing both ingredients in a disentangled way. However, this approach has some theoretical and practical drawbacks, for which reason several alternative paradigms of public decision making arose. In this paper we highlight the importance of another paradigm of such decision making within so-called epistemic regimes. We do so against the background of the discussion of value-neutral science and provide a conceptual analysis of the notion of a regime which allows us to outline the underlying structure of re-entangling knowledge and values in epistemic regimes.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2020KnoVal,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Volume = {47},
    Number = {1},
    Journal = {Science and Public Policy},
    Title = {Knowledge and Values: A re-entanglement in epistemic regimes},
    Doi = {10.1093/scipol/scz047},
    Year = {2020}}

  7. A Complementary Approach to Aristotle’s Account of Definition and Carnap’s Account of Explication.
    In: Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 22.1 (2020), pp.19-40. doi: 10.30965/9783957437310_003.
    Abstract
    In this paper it is argued that there are relevant similarities of Aristotle’s account of definition and Carnap’s account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle’s conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle’s account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle’s conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap’s condition of similarity once one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes in a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2020ComApp,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Journal = {Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy},
    Title = {A Complementary Approach to Aristotle’s Account of Definition and Carnap’s Account of Explication},
    Volume = {21},
    Number = {1},
    Pages = {19-40},
    Doi = {10.30965/9783957437310_003},
    Year = {2020}}

  8. Overflow, Expertise, and the L’Aquila Case.
    In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9.3 (2020), pp.25-33.
    Abstract
    In her “Exigency and Overflow in the L’Aquila Case” (2020), Danielle DeVasto comments on my (2019) rational reconstruction of the circumstances of the L’Aquila earthquake from 2009. In earlier work, DeVasto et al. (2016) have described the case as a case of so-called “overflow”, where matters of fact turn into matters of concern. In her comment, she points out that her understanding of the role of overflow – in the L’Aquila case but also more generally — differs from the way I address it in my reconstruction. In this reply, I provide more details about this difference and argue that it is due to different background assumptions regarding the value-neutrality or value-ladenness of science. However, I will also argue that strong versions of these background assumptions are hard to maintain and that a weakening of them brings our accounts of overflow closer to each other.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2020OveExp,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Journal = {Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective},
    Title = {Overflow, Expertise, and the L’Aquila Case},
    Volume = {9},
    Number = {3},
    Pages = {25-33},
    Year = {2020}}

  9. A Rational Reconstruction of the L’Aquila Case. How non-denial turns into acceptance.
    In: Social Epistemology 33.6 (2019), pp.503-513. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2019.1672825.
    A reply to and discussion of the paper can be found at the portal of the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (SERRC).
    Abstract
    In 2009, an earthquake struck the city L’Aquila, causing more than 300 deaths and leading to a trial which lasted almost four years and — though cleared in the appeal — in which scientists were sentenced to imprisonment for failing to adequately assist in public decision-making. In this paper, the particular role of scientists in risk assessment communication is investigated. The arguments put forward in the trial of this case are rationally reconstructed, evaluated, and our results are compared with other analyses of this case.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2019RatRec,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Journal = {Social Epistemology},
    Title = {A Rational Reconstruction of the L’Aquila Case. How non-denial turns into acceptance},
    Volume = {33},
    Number = {6},
    Pages = {503-513},
    Doi = {10.1080/02691728.2019.1672825},
    Year = {2019}}

  10. Newtons Methodologie: Eine Kritik an Duhem, Feyerabend und Lakatos.
    In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 101.4 (2019), pp.584-615. doi: 10.1515/agph-2019-4004.
    Abstract
    The Newtonian research program consists of the core axioms of the Principia Mathematica, a sequence of force laws and auxiliary hypotheses, and a set of methodological rules. The latter underwent several changes and so it is sometimes claimed that, historically seen, Newton and the Newtonians added methodological rules post constructione in order to further support their research agenda.
    An argument of Duhem, Feyerabend, and Lakatos aims to provide a theoretical reason why Newton could not have come up with his theory of the Principia in accordance with his own methodology: Since Newton’s starting point, Kepler’s laws, contradict the law of universal gravitation, he could not have applied the so-called method of analysis and synthesis. In this paper, this argument is examined with reference to the Principia’s several editions. Newton’s method is characterized, and necessary general background assumptions of the argument are made explicit. Finally, the argument is criticized based on a contemporary philosophy of science point of view.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2019NewMet,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Journal = {Archiv f{\”u}r Geschichte der Philosophie},
    Title = {Newtons Methodologie: Eine Kritik an Duhem, Feyerabend und Lakatos},
    Doi = {10.1515/agph-2019-4004},
    Pages = {584-615},
    Volume = {101},
    Number = {4},
    Year = {2019}}


  11. Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent? Well, it Depends….
    In: Philosophia 47.2 (2019), pp.395–424. doi: 10.1007/s11406-018-9985-6.
    Abstract
    Mereology, the theory of parts and wholes, is sometimes used as a framework for categorisation because it is regarded as ontologically innocent in the sense that the mereological fusion of some entities is nothing over and above the entities. In this paper it is argued that an adequate answer to the question of whether the thesis of the ontological innocence of mereology holds relies crucially on the underlying theory of reference. It is then shown that upholding the thesis comes at high costs, viz. at the cost of a quite strong logical background theory or at paradoxical ways of predicating and counting.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2019MerOnt,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Doi = {10.1007/s11406-018-9985-6},
    Issn = {1574-9274},
    Journal = {Philosophia},
    Keywords = {unrestricted composition, composition as identity, plural quantification, plural predication},
    Month = {Apr},
    Pages = {395-424},
    Title = {Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent? Well, it Depends{\ldots}},
    Volume = {47},
    Number = {2},
    Year = {2019}}

  12. Modeling Creative Abduction Bayesian Style.
    In: European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9.1 (2019), pp.1–15. doi: 10.1007/s13194-018-0234-4.
    (Together with Alexander Gebharter)
    Abstract
    Schurz (2008) proposed a justification of creative abduction on the basis of the Reichenbachian principle of the common cause. In this paper we take up the idea of combining creative abduction with causal principles and model instances of successful creative abduction within a Bayes net framework. We identify necessary conditions for such inferences and investigate their unificatory power. We also sketch several interesting applications of modeling creative abduction Bayesian style. In particular, we discuss use-novel predictions, confirmation, and the problem of underdetermination in the context of abductive inferences.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2019ModCre,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J. and Gebharter, Alexander},
    Doi = {10.1007/s13194-018-0234-4},
    Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science},
    Keywords = {creative abduction, theoretical concepts, Bayes nets, unification, novel predictions, underdetermination},
    Month = {Jan},
    Pages = {1-15},
    Title = {Modeling Creative Abduction Bayesian Style},
    Volume = {9},
    Number = {1},
    Year = {2019}}

  13. Knowledge First and Rational Action.
    In: Teorema. International Journal of Philosophy 37.2 (2018), pp.31–54. url: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/6414696.pdf.
    Abstract
    Knowledge first epistemology aims at dissolving deadlocks in epistemic research that seem to be caused by putting belief first. This new paradigm has an abductive methodology and a thesis on the explanatory priority of knowing in its core. From this it derives several knowledge norms as, e.g., the knowledge norm of action, which states that one should only act on what is known. While this norm gets things right with respect to epistemic standards and epistemic blamability, it runs counter to the traditional justification of the laws of belief and rationality of actions. This paper gives a historical and systematical overview of the belief first and knowledge first paradigms. The central claims regarding action are explicated and an exact formulation of the knowledge norm of action is provided and justified. This norm avoids the mentioned problems while at the same time maintaining the advantages of putting forward high epistemic standards.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2018KnoFir,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Journal = {Teorema. International Journal of Philosophy},
    Keywords = {knowledge first epistemology, knowledge norms, decision theory, probabilism, epistemic normativity, epistemic blamability},
    Pages = {31-54},
    Title = {Knowledge First and Rational Action},
    Url = {https://dialnet.unirioja.es/descarga/articulo/6414696.pdf},
    Volume = {37},
    Number = {2},
    Year = {2018}}

  14. Can Religious and Secular Belief be Rationally Combined?
    In: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82.3 (2017), pp.299–319. doi: 10.1007/s11153-017-9613-6.
    Abstract
    Sometimes the cognitive part of the human mind is modelled in a simplified way by degrees of belief. E.g., in philosophy of science and in formal epistemology agents are often identified by their credences in a set of claims. This line of dealing with the individual mind is currently expanded to groups by attempts of finding adequate ways of pooling individual degrees of belief into an overall group credence or, more abstractly speaking, into a collective mind.
    In this paper, we model religious people’s minds as such a collective mind. Religious people are therein identified with a set of degrees of beliefs containing religious and secular credences. E.g., within a religious context a person may be sure that some statement is true, whereas the same person lacks non-religious support for such a credence and hence may doubt the truth of that statement within a secular context. We will also present two results on the adequacy of this model.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2017CanRel,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Doi = {10.1007/s11153-017-9613-6},
    Issn = {1572-8684},
    Journal = {International Journal for Philosophy of Religion},
    Pages = {299-319},
    Title = {Can Religious and Secular Belief be Rationally Combined?},
    Volume = {82},
    Number = {3},
    Year = {2017}}

  15. One Dogma of Analyticism.
    In: Logique et Analyse 240 (2017), pp.429–444. doi: 10.2143/LEA.240.0.3254090.
    Abstract
    According to one view on analyticity in formal languages, a definition of ‘analytic’ can be given by semantic notions alone. In this contribution we are going to show that a purely semantic conception of analyticity is inadequate. To do so, we provide a method for transforming theories with a synthetic empirical basis into logical equivalent theories with an analytic “empirical” basis. We draw the conclusion that a definition of analyticity is adequate only if it is a pragmatic one.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2017OneDog,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Doi = {10.2143/LEA.240.0.3254090},
    Issn = {2295-5836},
    Journal = {Logique et Analyse},
    Pages = {429-444},
    Title = {{One Dogma of Analyticism}},
    Volume = {240},
    Year = {2017}}

  16. Optimisation in a Synchronised Prediction Setting.
    In: Journal for General Philosophy of Science 48.3 (2017), pp.419–437. doi: 10.1007/s10838-017-9379-7.
    Abstract
    The standard approach to solve prediction tasks is to apply inductive methods such as, e.g., the straight rule. Such methods are proven to be access-optimal in specific prediction settings, but not in all. Within the optimality-approach of meta-induction, success-based weighted prediction methods are proven to be access-optimal in all possible continuous prediction settings. However, meta-induction fails to be access-optimal in so-called demonic discrete prediction environments where the predicted value is inversely correlated with the true outcome. In this paper the problem of discrete prediction environments is addressed by embedding them into a synchronised prediction setting. In such a setting the task consists in providing a discrete and a continuous prediction. It is shown that synchronisation constraints exclude the possibility of demonic environments.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2017OptSyn,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Day = {01},
    Doi = {10.1007/s10838-017-9379-7},
    Issn = {1572-8587},
    Journal = {Journal for General Philosophy of Science},
    Pages = {419-437},
    Title = {Optimisation in a Synchronised Prediction Setting},
    Volume = {48},
    Number = {3},
    Year = {2017}}

  17. Knowledge by Narratives: On the Methodology of Stump’s Defence.
    In: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4.3 (2012), pp.155–165. doi: 10.24204/ejpr.v4i3.282.
    Abstract
    Eleonore Stump claims in her book ‘Wandering in Darkness’ that the problem of evil can be solved best by the help of narratives. This — so Stump — is due to the fact that narratives allow one to get a general view about relevant parts of the discussion of suffering. In this context she distinguishes the more detailed view of the discussion from a more general one by two different modes of cognition: the mode of gathering ‘knowledge that’ and that one of gathering ‘knowledge how’. Knowledge by narratives is a subcategory of the last-mentioned one.
    In the paper it is argued for the thesis that this distinction is not really crucial for Stump’s argumentation and that in fact only ‘knowledge that’ is relevant for her proposed solution.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2012KnoNar,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Doi = {10.24204/ejpr.v4i3.282},
    Journal = {European Journal for Philosophy of Religion},
    Pages = {155-165},
    Title = {{Knowledge by Narratives: On the Methodology of Stump’s Defence}},
    Volume = {4},
    Number = {3},
    Year = {2012}}

  18. Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds. A Comment.
    In: Analyse und Kritik 34.2 (2012), pp.367–382. doi: 10.1515/auk-2012-0213.
    Abstract
    In their paper on the influence of meta-induction to the wisdom of the crowd, Paul Thorn and Gerhard Schurz argue that adding meta-inductive methods to a group influences the group positively, whereas replacing independend methods of a group with meta-inductive ones may have a negative impact. The first fact is due to an improvement of average ability of a group, the second fact is due to an impairment of average diversity within a group by meta-induction. In this paper some critical remarks to meta-inductive group expansion and replacement are made. In particular it is stressed that both ability and diversity are of equal importance to a group’s performance.

    BibTeX
    @article{cit:feldbacher-escamilla2012MetInd,
    Author = {Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J.},
    Doi = {10.1515/auk-2012-0213},
    Issn = {0171-5860},
    Journal = {Analyse und Kritik},
    Pages = {367-382},
    Title = {{Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds. A Comment}},
    Volume = {34},
    Number = {2},
    Year = {2012}}

Edited Volumes

Cultural Evolution and Generalized Darwinism

Title: Cultural Evolution and Generalized Darwinism. Theory and Applications

Special Issue of The American Philosophical Quarterly (58.1, 2021)

Edited together with: Karim Baraghith and Corina Strößner

With Contributions of: Daniel Dennett (Tufts), Kate Distin (Southam), Simon Huttegger (Irvine) & Hannah Rubin (Notre Dame) & Kevin Zollman (Carnegie Mellon), Alex Mesoudi (Exeter), Thomas Reydon (Hannover), Alex Rosenberg (Duke), Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf)

Podcast contribution about the special issue:

Logical Perspectives on Science and Cognition

Title: Logical Perspectives on Science and Cognition. The Philosophy of Gerhard Schurz

Special Issue of Synthese (197.4, 2020)

Edited together with: Alexander Gebharter, Peter Brössel, and Markus Werning

With Contributions of: Elke Brendel (Bonn), Gustavo Cevolani (IMT Lucca) & Roberto Festa (Trieste), Igor Douven (CNRS, Paris), Jonathan Evans (Plymouth) & Shira Elqayam (De Montfort), Ulrike Hahn (Birkbeck) & Jens Ulrik Hansen (Roskilde) & Erik J. Olsson (Lund), Andreas Hüttemann (Cologne), Theo Kuipers (Groningen), Ilkka Niiniluoto (Helsinki), Nina Retzlaff (Düsseldorf), Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf), Wolfgang Spohn (Konstanz), Ioannis Votsis (London)

Inductive Metaphysics

Title: Inductive Metaphysics: Contemporary and Historical Issues

Special Issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien (98.1, 2021)

Edited together with: Kristina Engelhard, Alexander Gebharter, and Ansgar Seide

With Contributions of: Amanda Bryant (Lisbon), Ralf Busse (Mainz), Kristina Engelhard (Trier), Arnaud Pelletier (Brusseles), Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf), Ansgar Seide (Münster), Peter Simons (Dublin), and Matthew Tugby (Durham).

Philosophy of Science

Title: Philosophy of Science Between the Natural Sciences the Social Sciences and the Humanities. Selected papers of the triennial conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science GWP.2016, Düsseldorf, March 8–11, 2016

Special Issue of Journal for General Philosophy of Science (48.3, 2017)

Edited together with: Alexander Gebharter and Gerhard Schurz

With Contributions of: Alexander Christian (Düsseldorf), Carsten Held (Erfurt), Beate Krickel (Bochum), Stathis Psillos (Athens), Alex Rosenberg (Duke), Markus Schrenk (Düsseldorf), Gila Sher (San Diego), Christian Wallmann (Canterbury)

Book Chapters

  1. “Inductive Metaphysics”. In: Special Issue: Inductive Metaphysics. Contemporary and Historical Issues. Ed. by Kristina Engelhard and Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla and Alexander Gebharter and Ansgar Seide. Grazer Philosophische Studien 98.1, 2021, pp.1-26. doi: 10.1163/18756735-00000129.
    (Together with Kristina Engelhard, Alexander Gebharter, and Ansgar Seide)
  2. “Newton’s Abductive Methodology”. In: Proceedings of the Second International Congress of the Russian Society of History and Philosophy of Science: “Science as a public good”. Ed. by The Russian Society of History and Philosophy of Science, RSHPS. Moscow: ROIFN Publishing House, 2020, pp.11-14.
  3. “Meta-Induction, Probability Aggregation, and Optimal Scoring”. In: KI 2020: Advances in Artificial Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. Volume 12325. Ed. by Ute Schmid and Franziska Klügl and Diedrich Wolter. Cham: Springer Nature, 2020, pp.355-357. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-58285-2.
    (Together with Gerhard Schurz)
  4. “Introduction”. In: Special Issue: Logical Perspectives on Science and Cognition. Ed. by Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla and Alexander Gebharter and Peter Brössel and Markus Werning. Synthese 197.4, 2020, pp.1381-1390. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02334-2.
    (Together with Alexander Gebharter, Peter Brössel, and Markus Werning)
  5. “Philosophy of Science Between the Natural Sciences, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities: Introduction”. In: Special Issue: Philosophy of Science Between the Natural Sciences the Social Sciences and the Humanities. Ed. by Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla and Alexander Gebharter and Gerhard Schurz. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, (48:3) 2017, pp.317–326. doi: 10.1007/s10838-017-9378-8.
    (Together with Alexander Gebharter and Gerhard Schurz)
  6. “Automatic Metaphor Interpretation in the Framework of Structural Semantics”. In: Proceedings of the Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB) 2015 Convention. April 20–22. Ed. by Colin Johnson. AISB. Canterbury, 2015.
  7. “Is the Equal-Weight View Really Supported by Positive Crowd Effects?” In: Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Ed. By Uskali Mäki and Ioannis Votsis and Stephanie Ruphy and Gerhard Schurz. Heidelberg: Springer, 2015, pp.87–98. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-23015-3_7.
  8. “A Conventional Foundation of Logic”. In: Actas. Proceedings of the VIII. Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science. Ed. By José Martínez and Manuel García-Carpintero and José Díez and Sergi Oms. Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 2015, pp.18–20.
  9. “Analogies in Scientific Explanations: Concept Formation by Analogies in Cultural Evolutionary Theory”. In: Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy. Ed. By Henrique Jales Ribeiro. New York: Springer, 2014, pp.209–226. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-06334-8_12.
  10. Metaethische Bemerkungen zur religiösen Begründung der Moral. In: Erwägen – Wissen – Ethik / Deliberation – Knowledge – Ethics 25.1, 2014, pp.18–21.
    (Together with Albert J.J. Anglberger)
  11. “Programme einer Kultur der Hoffnung in kritischer Lesart”. In: Eine Kultur der Hoffnung bauen: Papst Benedikt XVI. und die Idee guter Zukunft. Ed. by Clemens Sedmak and Helmut P. Gaisbauer and Marina P. Teixeira. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2013, pp.140–154.
  12. “Intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit und das Nicht-Identitäts-Problem”. In: Ethics – Society – Politics. Papers of the 35th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2012. Ed. by Martin G. Weiss and Hajo Greif. Kirchberg am Wechsel: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2012, pp.72–74.
  13. “Eine reliabilistische Rechtfertigung des Wertes von Wissen über Theorien”. In: Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011. Ed. by Christoph Jäger and Winfried Löffler. Kirchberg am Wechsel: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2011, pp.11–13.
    (Together with Albert J.J. Anglberger)
  14. “Papst Benedikt XVI. im europäischen Dialog”. In: Die Seele Europas. Papst Benedikt XVI. und die europäische Identität. Ed. by Clemens Sedmak and Stefan O. Horn. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 2011, pp.345–381.
    (Together with Gunter Graf and Irene Klissenbauer and Marina Teixeira)
  15. “Neue Technik und ad-hoc-Hypothesen vom wissenschaftstheoretischen Standpunkt”. In: Tagungsband der Nachwuchstagungen für Junge Philosophie in Darmstadt. Ed. by Suzana Alpsancar and Kai Denker. Marburg: Tectum, 2011, pp.197–219.
  16. “Ancient and Modern Ethics Combined”. In: Athens Dialogues E-Journal. 2010. url: http://athensdialogues.chs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/WebObjects/athensdialogues.woa/wa/dist?dis=104
    This paper was declared a Winner of the Culture Past, Culture Future Competition, organised by EUNIC Greece, 2010.
  17. “Richard Dawkins Hauptargument wissenschaftstheoretisch betrachtet”. In: Neuer Atheismus wissenschaftlich betrachtet. Ed. by Albert J.J. Anglberger and Paul Weingartner. Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt: Ontos, 2010, pp.181– 197. doi: 10.1515/9783110319736.181.
    (Together with Albert J.J. Anglberger and Stefan H. Gugerell)